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We report the results of a pre-registered analysis of data from the English Longitudinal Study of Aging
that was designed to test the hypothesis that economic scarcity is associated with individual differences
in decision-making. We tested this hypothesis by comparing time preferences for different socio-
economic groups and in geographical areas ranging from the most deprived to the least deprived in
England using the English Indices of Multiple Deprivation. The data supported this hypothesis: People in
the most deprived areas were more likely to prefer smaller sooner rewards than people from the least
deprived areas. Similarly, people in technical or routine occupations tended to prefer smaller sooner
rewards than people in professional or intermediate occupations. In addition, we found that gender,
length of education, cognitive function, and subjective social status also predicted time preferences. We
discuss these results in the context of theoretical models of scarcity-based models of choice behaviour
and decision-making.
Introduction
Why are some people more impulsive than others? It is an important question because impulsivity is a
risk factor for many of the behaviors that we, as a society consider problematic either when they are
prohibited such as drug abuse, or are permitted but are taken to excess such as gambling, smoking
tobacco, or drinking alcohol. Impulsivity also features as a criterion in a wide range of other psychiatric
disorders, for example, Antisocial Personality Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and Attention De cit Disorder. It
is important, therefore, to understand why some people are more prone to making impulsive decisions.
Although twin studies suggest that around 50% of the variability in impulsivity is heritable 1,2, that leaves
a further 50% attributable to environmental factors. Evidence suggests that impulsivity, and symptoms of
psychiatric disorders that feature impulsivity as a criterion, may not be normally distributed across the
population 3–5. This suggests that differences in environmental circumstances might give rise to
differences in levels of impulsivity. A reasonable question is to ask what these circumstances might be. In
this paper we explore the possibility that individual differences in impulsivity arise from differences in
economic environments. In short, we test the scarcity hypothesis of impulsivity.
The scarcity hypothesis
Resource insecurity in animals, and its analogue, economic scarcity in humans, is a leading candidate of
an environmental driver of choice behaviour. It is well established that early childhood deprivation has
serious consequences for children’s neurobiological, social, behavioural, and cognitive development:
Adults who have experienced severe deprivation as children for prolonged periods are more likely to be
diagnosed with a wide range of psychiatric, cognitive, and social impairment 6. Even within a more
normal range of experience children from poorer backgrounds are less able to delay of grati cation than
children from more a uent backgrounds 7. 
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There are a number of plausible explanations why scarcity or resource insecurity might affect decision-
making.  For example, obesity is associated with perceived or actual food insecurity 8,9, potentially as an
insurance against future deprivation 10. This could be both metabolic in the sense that people and other
animals tend to lay down greater fat stores and seek calori c foods when they encounter unpredictable
food resources; and social in the sense that these effects appear to be greater in lower status than higher
status individuals 9. 
In some models scarcity directly affects decision-making because a scarcity of resources makes any
decision about money are more salient, more frequent, and more immediate period of time than for more
well-off people 11,12. People in lower income brackets tend to spend a greater proportion of their income
on housing, and are less likely to own their own homes. Similarly, people from less a uent socio-
economic groups are more less likely to deposit money in savings accounts, are more likely to use any
disposable income on short-term outgoings 13,14, spend a higher proportion of their income on lottery
tickets 15, and are willing to accept higher rates of interest on loans even when eligibility is held constant
16. Experimental manipulations designed to induce a ‘poverty mindset’ generally support this scarcity
hypothesis. In a series of experiments reported by Shah et al 11 participants were given either small or
large budgets to use in a series of economic games. When their budgets ran out loans were made
available to continue playing. The participants given smaller budgets were more likely to borrow, and did
so at higher rates of interest than the participants given larger budgets. 
Since scarcity makes  nancial interactions more salient and more immediate, we reasoned that scarity
may be a factor that uniderlying individual differences in impulsivity, and provide a plausible account for
the uneven distribution of imulsivity across the demographic groups. A common factor in imulsivity is
time preference.
Impulsivity as time preference
Impulsivity is a multi-faceted construct. However, a common theme is that impulsivity is associated with
a general time preference for smaller-sooner rewards rather than larger-later rewards 17–20. Delay
discounting is a psychophysical measure of time preference in which people are given a series of choices
between monetary rewards after increasing delay periods, for example from one day to ten years 21. The
relative preferences for $100 tomorrow rather than $1000 in say, ten years-time indicates the degree to
which the individual discounts the future value of the $1000. By titrating the delay period, it is possible to
derive a single parameter estimate (k) of an individual’s or a group’s relative preference for small-sooner
rewards over larger later rewards. It is analogous to Mischel’s delay of grati cation test in children 20. The
validity of time preferences as a measure underlying impulsivity is its relationship with impulsive
behaviours that are associated with addiction. Steeper discount rates are associated with a range of
addictive behaviors including tobacco smoking 22, severity of Alcohol Use Disorders 23, gambling 24,
cocaine and heroin use  25. Evidence is also emerging that steeper discounting is also associated with
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behaviors that are not at present formally regarded as behavioural addictions, but which may be
categorized as such in the future, including eating disorders 26, and Internet Gaming Disorder  27. 
The association between psychophysical and psychometric measures of impulsivity lends delay
discounting a degree of construct validity. Discount rates are moderately correlated with established
psychometric measures of impulsivity such as the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11) 28–30 the UPPS
Impulsivity Scale 31,32. These psychometric measures however, contain a range of factors that we might
not expect to be related to time preferences, and frequently are only poorly related to each other. Although
time preferences and psychometric measures of impulsivity has a large heritable component a meta-
analysis of available data 2 of more than 27,000 twin pairs across 41 studies provides compelling
evidence for heritable and environmental in uences across the spectrum of impulsivity. The results for
laboratory tasks including time preferences indicate that additive and non-additive genetic effects explain
32% and 19% of the variance, respectively. Non-shared environmental effects explain 49% of the variance.
Psychometric measures show a similar pro le with additive genetic factors explaining 38% of the
variance, non-additive genetic factors 13%, and non-shared environmental effects accounting for 50% of
the variance in impulsivity. In the study that follows we test the hypothesis that at scarcity accounts for
some of the individual differences in impulsivity.
Overview of the study
In the study that follows we make use of secondary data to  rst test the hypothesis that impulsivity in the
form of time preference is not uniformly distributed across socio-economic groups. However, this
evidence is only indicative that scarcity is a causal factor in impulsivity as an individual difference. Socio-
economic status is typically recorded using occupation, and although occupations differ considerably in
remuneration this does not imply poverty, and not every member of even the least a uent occupational
groups experience signi cant and prolonged hardship. Instead we used the Indices of Multiple
Deprivation to test the scarcity hypothesis to examine whether social deprivation predicts time
preferences. Access to the Indices of Multiple Deprivation is restricted and requires a special license from
the UK Data Service. We pre-registered our method and analysis with the UK Data Service in order to
obtain this license and also with the Open Science Framework (DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/X2QYR) prior to
obtaining access to the data.
Method
The data were drawn from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). This is a representative
sample of about 11,000 people aged over 50 years living in England. The survey design is similar to the
US Health and Retirement Survey. The  rst wave of the survey began in in 2002 and subsequent waves
occurred at two-year intervals. The sample is periodically refreshed to compensate for attrition and to
incorporate new cohorts of older adults. Wave 5 was conducted between 2010 and 2011 and included a
measure of impulsivity that is closely related to delay-reward discounting. Of the 10,274 participants in
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Wave 5, 1,557 respondents aged 50-74 were pre-selected completed the relevant suite of questions, and
of these 1063 completed the time preference measure. The average age of the 479 male participants was
63.65 years (sd = 5.938), the average age of the 584 female participants was 62.68 (sd = 6.08). 
Data Availability
The data are available from the UK Data Archive but a special license is required to access and use the
Indices of Multiple Deprivation.
Ethics Approval and Informed Consent
The participants consented to take part in the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing which was approved
by the National Research Ethics Service (London Multicentre Research Ethics Committee
(MREC/01/2/91)). All methods were performed in accordance with the relevant guidelines and
regulations. The research was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Time preference
The time preference measure was called the ‘rectangle game’. This consisted of 12 questions between a
 xed £25 in two weeks, or [£26, £28, £30, £32, £35] in one month; and [£26, £30, £35, 37, £40, £45] in two
months. As an incentive the participants were each paid £20 for taking part in the survey plus an
endowment of £10 to play the two games. They were told that they could win an additional £70
depending on the choices that they make, or lose £5 from the endowment. The computer randomly
selected one of the trials from the game as payment.
English Indices of Multiple Deprivation
The English Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) is the o cial UK government measure of relative
deprivation in England. The IMD divides England into 32,844 neighbourhoods of around 650 households
or 1500 residents. The 2015 data are based on the 2012-13 tax year. The overall index is composed of
Income Deprivation, Employment Deprivation, Education, Skills and Training Deprivation, Health
Deprivation and Disability, Crime, Barriers to Housing and Services, and Living Environment Deprivation.
For our purposes the data are collapsed into quintiles of deprivation from poorest to wealthiest.
Socio-economic status
Social-economic status is recorded in the United Kingdom by occupation. The ELSA survey recorded
socio-economic status using the National Statistics Socio-economic classi cation (NS-SEC). This system
categorises occupations into a number of categories. We used the  ve-class model from 1 = Managerial,
administrative, and professional occupations, 2 = Intermediate occupations, 3 = Small employers and
own account workers, 4 = Lower supervisory and technical occupations, 5 = Semi-routine and routine
occupations. These are intended to be nominal categories rather than ordinal classes 33. However, they
are naturally related to annual income and level of educational quali cation.
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Executive function
Executive function was assessed using a composite measure from  ve different tasks completed as part
of the ELSA’s cognitive function module, designed to test prospective memory, immediate recall, delayed
recall,  uency, and attention. This approach has been previously described by James and Ferguson 34.
At the very beginning of the module, participants were told that they would be given a clipboard and
pencil during the cognitive function testing. They were also told that when they were given these, they
should write their initials in the top left-hand corner of the paper (prospective memory). Performance on
this test was scored from 0 to 5 (5 = completed task correctly without prompting, 4 = partially completed
the task (either wrote initials elsewhere or something in top left corner) without prompting, 3 = did
something else, or declared they did not remember what to do without prompting, 2 = completed task
after prompting, 1 = partially completed task after prompting, 0 = did nothing or failed to remember after
prompting).
Participants were then randomly assigned to receive one of four different sets of words, which were then
read aloud to the participant. The participant was then asked to tell the interviewer the words they could
recall (immediate recall), and at the end of the module they were asked again without warning to recall
the same list of words (delayed recall). During the module, participants were also instructed to say aloud
as many animal names as they could think of in 60 seconds ( uency). Participants were also asked to
complete a letter cancellation task (attention), in which they were instructed to cross out all instance of
two letters on a sheet of text. 
To develop the composite measure, these scores were entered into a principal components analysis.
Parallel analysis indicated that all items loaded strongly onto a single component. As such, component
scores were extracted using the regression method to index executive function.
Results
Pre-registered analysis
We began with our pre-registered analysis. Participants whose NS-SEC category and/or the age that they
left education was not recorded were excluded from the analyses leaving participants 992 available for
analysis. Figure 1 shows time preferences for each socio-economic group. Figure 2 shows time
preferences for each quintile Index of Multiple Deprivation. 
We entered age, gender (dummy coded with 1 = male, 2 = female), 5 factor NS-SEC, and Quintile Indices
of Multiple Deprivation (from 1 = least deprived to 5 = most deprived), and age education ended as
predictor variables, and the number of larger later choices as the dependent variable. We dummy coded
the NS-SEC and used managerial as the reference category because we expected this group to be the
least impulsive and because it was also the largest group (n = 394). The model was signi cant: R2 = .073,
se = 4.003, F8, 999 = 9.797, p < .001. The regression coe cients shown in Table 1 con rm our hypothesis
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that Indices of Multiple Deprivation, Socio-economic Classi cation, and Age Education Ended were all
reliable and independent predictors of time preferences. Neither age nor gender predicted time
preferences.
Table 1 Regression coe cients for the preregistered analysis. 
Predictor variable Regression coe cients
b se β t p
Age 0.021 0.022 0.030 0.965 .335
Gender -0.364 0.267 -0.044 -1.364 .173
IMD -319 0.098 -0.104 -3.257 .001
Age education ended 0.183 0.091 0.070 2.001 .046
Professional vs intermediate  0.063 0.429 0.005 0.148 .882
Professional vs. Small employers -0.403 0.416 -0.33 -0.969 .333
Professional vs lower technical -2.415 0.500 -0.164 -4.832 .000
           
Professional vs Routine -1.280 0.357 -0.138 -3.587 .000
Extended analyses
The dataset allows further analyses to test our hypothesis and allow us to examine variable that might
confound or contribute to social status and decision-making. For example, subjective social status can be
a better predictor of health outcomes than objective measures such as socio-economic group 34,
and intelligence could be the common underlying factor between occupational group, or education. We
were able to compute a proximal measure of cognitive function that approximated to a single measure of
executive function (see Methods). The model was signi cant: R2 = .081, se = 3.966, F10, 931 = 8.090, p <
.001. Both cognitive function and subjective social status were reliable predictors of time preferences, but
these were additional factors to deprivation and socio-economic status. The regression coe cients
shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Regression coe cients for the extended analysis. 
Page 8/13
Predictor variable Regression coe cients
b se β t p
Age 0.033 0.023 0.048 1.439 .150
Gender -0.587 0.277 -0.071 -2.119 .034
IMD -0.275 0.102 -0.090 -2.702 .007
           
Age education ended 0.27 0.98 0.10 0.273 .785
Cognitive function 0.412 0.150 0.096 2.745 .006
Subjective Social Status 0.021 0.009 0.084 2.380 .018
Professional vs intermediate 0.124 0.442 0.010 0.273 .779
Professional vs small employers -0.206 0.432 -0.017 -0.477 .634
Professional vs lower technical -2.123 0.516 -0.144 -4.118 .000
Professional vs routine -0.962 0.374 -0.105 -2.576 .010
Discussion
Economic scarcity is associated with individual differences in decision-making 35. Similarly, people from
less a uent socio-economic groups are more likely to engage in, and suffer greater harms from, a range
addictive behaviours such as smoking 36, alcohol consumption 37, and gambling 38. We hypothesised
that time preferences could be a mediating factor in the uneven distribution of addictive behaviours
across socio-economic groups, and that individual differences in time preferences result, in part, from the
experience of economic scarcity. In short, when resources are scarce or uncertain it may be reasonable, if
not optimal, to consume available resources immediately rather than to save them for the future. This
choice behaviour can become maladaptive when it becomes a general individual difference that is
applied across a range of behaviours such as potentially addictive behaviours.
We tested this hypothesis by comparing time preferences for different socio-economic groups and in
geographical areas ranging from the most deprived to the least deprived in England using the English
Indices of Multiple Deprivation. The data supported this hypothesis: People in the most deprived areas
were more likely to prefer smaller sooner rewards than people from the least deprived areas. Similarly,
people in technical or routine occupations tended to prefer smaller sooner rewards than people in
professional or intermediate occupations. We sought to exclude potentially confounding variable such as
educational attainment or intelligence. To do so we constructed a variable to measure executive function
and a proxy for intelligence, and controlled for the length of education. We also included a measure of
subjective social status because this can be a better predictor of health than objective measures.
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Executive function and subjective social status were reliable predictors of time preferences in their own
right but did not eliminate the effects of either deprivation or socio-economic status. The data clearly
show that people in more deprived geographical areas make more impulsive choices than people from
more a uent geographical areas. We regard this as strong evidence for the scarcity hypothesis. But there
is more than one potential mechanism by which scarcity can affect individual differences in choice
behaviour.
Impulsivity as faulty foraging. 
Decision-making in humans shares many similarities with foraging behaviour in other animals 39. Choice
tasks that indicate of time preferences are strikingly similar to models of optimal foraging, and a number
of researchers have drawn parallels between them 41–43. The foraging behaviour of groups and the
choice behaviour of individuals are described by synonymous mathematical models42,44.
Our hypothesis borrows from the Thrifty Phenotype Hypothesis 44 that links adult ill-health to pre-natal
nutrition. In this model, low availability of nutrients during pre-natal development programs the foetus’
metabolic systems to expect a sparse nutritional environment. This is an adaptive mechanism that
allows the developing child to e ciently process scarce resources during childhood. But if, as is likely in
developed economies, after birth the infant encounters abundant resources, the adaptation becomes
maladaptive and could be a risk factor for adult diabetes and obesity. The basic premise is as follows:
The experience of a scarcity or uncertainty in resources causes adaption of foraging behaviour. This
adaptation becomes a stable individual difference that, as an adult, and in an abundant environment
becomes maladaptive, leaving the individual vulnerable to addiction and other impulse control disorders.
We propose that the experience of scarce or uncertain resources causes an adaptive shift in choice
behaviour that motivates the individual to consume proportionately more of the currently available
resources than they would when resources are abundant in the expectation that future resources will also
be unpredictable. The consequence of setting the parameters that govern choice behaviour at an early
age, leaves the child who experiences scarcity relatively more vulnerable to obesity, addiction and debt as
an adult. Individual differences in decision-making may result from the foraging responses that make
sense in different environmental conditions such as scarcity of resources. For example, in periods of
abundant resources it does not make sense to deplete the available resources since these could be
preserved for the future. Thus, in periods of abundance it is more optimal to exhibit self-control or delay
grati cation. However, in periods of scarcity it makes more sense to deplete the available resources even
if that results in an uncertain future. The classic  nding in humans is that children who performed poorly
in the original Stanford Marshmallow test had poorer life outcomes 18,45 including higher BMI, alcohol
and drug use.
 In our model, we propose that children who encounter periods of scarcity acquire a foraging strategy that
becomes a stable individual difference in adulthood choice behaviour. Behavioral evidence from other
species is consistent with this hypothesis. For example, developmentally disadvantaged starlings tend to
overmatch when foraging and are physically larger in adulthood than developmentally advantaged
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birds 46. Similarly, rats show greater sensitivity to resource allocation in predicable environments
compared to unpredictable environments 47. Pigeons show rapid adjustments in habitat matching when
resource availability changes and that at group level sensitivity decreases as the unpredictability of the
recourse availability increases 48.
Conclusion
People who experience economic scarcity appear to make more impulsive choice than people who live in
more a uent areas. Similarly, people who work in manual occupations tend to be more impulsive than
those who work in professional occupations. These effects are additional to, and independent of, the
effects of education or cognitive function. We argue that the experience of economic scarcity has a
casual in uence on time preference as a relatively stable individual difference in decision making, which
in turn provides an explanation for the uneven distribution of addictive behaviours across social groups.
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Showing time preferences (number of larger later choices) by Socio-economic Classi cation (1 =
Managerial, administrative, and professional occupations, 2 = Intermediate occupations, 3 = Small
employers and own account workers, 4 = Lower supervisory and technical occupations, 5 = Semi-routine
and routine occupations).
Figure 2
Showing time preferences (number of larger later choices) for each quintile Index of Multiple Deprivation
from 1 = least deprived to 5 = most deprived.
Supplementary Files
This is a list of supplementary  les associated with this preprint. Click to download.
SupplementaryTable.docx
Supplementarymaterial.docx
